Tutors and Pupils: International Organizations, Central European Elites and Western Models in Governance

A. Main Hypotheses of Relevance to PDT

External Players and Influences

General

Wade studies how the EU and NATO act as “institutional tutors”. He examines Hungary and the Czech Republic’s reasons for imitating Western institutions following the collapse of the Communist regimes and argues that the imitation is not a quick-fix, rather is a catalyst for a process requiring significant subsequent modifications. However, while effective in the short term, it brings some long-term implications.

Elites

Elites choose to imitate Western institutions because it is administratively expedient and useful for building political coalitions. Rather than rejecting Western structures, CEEC elites are learning to analyze which aspects of the institutions are useful and which are not. Wade argues that they should borrow selectively and make adaptations in order to respond to local circumstances. This experimental process makes states more democratic and prepares them for the obligations of membership that are demanded by Western international organizations.

EU and NATO

It is easier for a country to meet the stated criteria of international organizations if they are modeling their reforms on Western models, which facilitates and promotes the transition to a democratic state.
B. Article Summary

The article seeks to answer the question of what happens when international actors aggressively promote institutional changes within the context of a massive shift in domestic structures.

Ward outlines two caveats:

-  imitation is not the sole means of institution-building;

- Western international organizations can not control the process by forcing their structures onto elites.

Wade offers four reasons to explain why elites are willing to imitate Western organizations. Firstly, because it decreases both uncertainty and the time that experimentation would take. Secondly, by acting as substitutions, the process of imitation makes it easier for elites to get rid of the institutions that previously existed. Thirdly, it promised elites a “‘legitimacy windfall’ vis-à-vis their own polities, which whom they had fragile ties of loyalty and trust” (172). Lastly, it reassured Western investors and political figures, whose investment elites relied on to achieve democratic capitalism.

Ward points to three obstacles that elites were faced with, which were solved easily through imitation. The first was rapidity, since the collapse of the communist regime was unexpected, ideas for institutional renewal and reform were few and weak. The lack of alternatives led to a spirit of conservatism, which, coupled with Westerners promoting their institutions, resulted in elites inside CEEC societies willingly choosing to replace old institutions with ones based partially or wholly on Western designs.

-The second problem was one of simultaneity, as states were faced to adjust to the dual transformations to capitalist markets and pluralistic democracy. This left too many tasks for the government to manage at once. Moreover, the newly established governments lacked a power source to “hold back” reforms in one region while consolidating changes in the other, as demonstrated by the weakness of the government in the Czech Republic and Hungary.

-The third problem that elites faced was the absence of well-organized civil society, which results in the absence of societal interest articulation, which is necessary to dictate the creation of new institutions.

He describes three functions that the models served and illustrates how those were reasons why members inside the CEEC, when measuring the cost and benefits of adopting different foreign models, chose Western models.

-Western institutions served as templates, and “provided the outline of an institutional structure of policy explicitly” but did not detail every single aspect of the model nor, are they forced onto elites. Wade points to several policies adopted by both Hungarian and Czech officials, particularly in health care and competition policy, which illustrate that although the government was imitating the Western model, modifications and adaptations to the template could be made. This is evidence that the templates are voluntary, flexible and meant to fit the needs of the specific country.

-Western models also provide thresholds, which are “qualitative and subjective judgments about minimum standards that formal structures must meet to qualify a CEEC nation for membership in an international organization” (181). Elites can choose if they want to meet this threshold by imitating Western structures of it they would rather attempt to meet the criteria through different structures. Their progress is monitored by agents whose purpose is to assist the country in achieving the standards. As a consequence of the screenings conducted by the international organizations, thresholds, which the country is forced to meet, are created. This, in turn, creates incentives for emulation without mandating explicitly it.

-Institutions also allow adjustments, since they serve simply as a guide, and countries can make small corrections while maintaining the larger institutional scheme, which allows elites to still dictate the laws of their country.

Despite the benefits of imitating the models, there are also costs for the elites.

-Firstly, it obscures the ability to question the assumptions on which the models were originally created on, by injecting politics into issues of institutional construction.

-Secondly, the focus on “busyness” of professional advice-givers in CEEC obscures silences on crucial issues unaddressed by Western models. This means that elites are not made aware that the models offer no solutions for some of the polities’ most difficult questions.

-Finally, emphasizing Western generosity should not obscure the fact that that the primary responsibility for solving Eastern problems should lie inside the CEEC. This forces the citizens of the CEEC to depend upon Western advice and designs for years to come.

(Summarized by Joana Sidarov, 02/07)