The Position of Interest Groups in Eastern European Democracies: Maturing Servicemen or Trojan Horses?

A. Main Hypotheses of Relevance to PDT

Political Dynamics

The role of elites and of individual leaders

Korkut argues that Eastern European elites are also responsible for the slow development of democracy. Early stages have been marked with rapid consolidation of political parties along with the emergence of an elite group of people that dominate both the political and civil society. The elite are seen as an obstacle to the road towards democratization.

Civil society

It is not just the existence of a vibrant civil society, but more importantly the existence of democratic structure within interest groups of this society that lends itself to democratic transition. There remains a substantial democratic deficit within interest groups; their internal decision making structures appear to be far from transparent and participatory. Korkut claims that this comes about from role ambiguity, conceptual ambiguity and representational ambiguity.

B. Article Summary

This paper proposes that as long as civil society groups are not internally democratic, they cannot serve as schools of democracy for their members (1).

Two hypotheses:

• “[T]here is a democratic deficit in the internal decision making structures of interest groups due to maturing democratic culture in Eastern Europe. Therefore, this hypothesis sees civil society actors in the region as ‘maturing servicemen of democracy’. As a sign of this maturation, civil society still suffers from a role ambiguity, conceptual ambiguity and representational ambiguity” (1).
• Democratic deficit in internal decision making within interest groups is due to inherent self-concerned & elitist behaviours of leading strata in interest groups (2)

Social Networks, Development of Civic Culture: An Explicit Political Culture for Eastern Europe?

• “[T]here is a remarkable democratic deficit within interest groups at the face of sedimented oligarchies and leadership structures. Internal decision making within interest groups is far from being transparent and participatory. All these illustrate a weltering picture for the salience of civil society in the region, if one is to contemplate on their expected role as schools of democracy” (5-6).
• “In Putnam’s terminology, only if civil society is organized around horizontal bonds of mutual solidarity rather than vertical bonds of dependency, will it produce trust and co-operation. Horizontal decision making procedures allocate an equal voice to all members. Collective participation as well shapes the ‘consciousness’ of individuals as it shapes their interests, their commitments and understanding of the situation. A vertically organized civil society, however, can be in itself an obstacle to democracy. Civil societies are not formed to privilege certain strata or to tolerate rent-seeking behaviour. Collective action and organization should empower a civil society supportive of democratization. As such, these organization shift power away from solid domination of a small minority onto a more open and equal network of interaction of equals” (7-8).

Hypothesis I: Undemocratic Internal Decision Making within interest groups is due to Maturing Democratic Political Culture in Eastern Europe

• Role Ambiguity:
  • Members’ roles and duties within interest groups, borders of political and civil spheres & ways of pursuing member interests are not clear for interest groups (9).
  • “Employers’ organizations in Eastern Europe gave an impression that they functioned as if they were some forms of consultancy firms rather than interest groups… [A] clear representational domain was missing and social networks mainly revolved around entrepreneurial benefit. Thus, a role ambiguity arises for employers’ organizations between a civil society group and an entrepreneurial organization” (10).
  • Two explanations:
    • “The very fact that the new private sector is created by a rapid top-down distribution of mechanisms instead of an evolutionary bottom-up accumulation means that the new private entrepreneur class remains disorganizes and fragmented in fractions of political networks and clientele” (10).
    • “[ T]he weak group mobilization is due to the atmosphere of distrust and conflict in the new entrepreneurial world in Easter Europe” (10).
  • “We can only talk about group consciousness in terms of labour organizations. For them the constituencies were clear and the respondent from this sector presented a much better understanding of their respective roles towards their members. This relative professionalism was most probably due to the communist legacy and trade union structures inherited form the old system. Still … respondents both from labour and job provider groups believed that common benefit was more important than personal benefit. This might suggest that a group identity is developing in interest groups” (11).
  • “[S]econdary decision making bodies were extremely self-contained and oligarchic. Even the detailed accounts of proceedings were unlikely to be published, though decisions were briefly mentioned in the union press” (12).
• Conceptual Ambiguity:
  • Hungary:
    • “[C]ertain forms of democratic decision making (importance paid to conferences) are entrenched, while some others (means of egalitarian participation) are still in the making” (17).
    • “Respondents having realized the importance of members’ involvement, still could not confide a full trust in their members. This is a reflection of an elite-oriented approach… As such, there appears a conceptual ambiguity between an elite oriented approach and an egalitarian one” (17-18).
  • Poland:
    • “[S]imilar to Hungary in Poland conceptualization of dependency on members is problematic. Despite praising conferences and member involvement during informal talks, later respondents demonstrate actual vertical bonds of dependency within their organization. As a result, Polish interest groups also draw conceptually ambiguous picture and as such prepare the ground for their questionable position as schools of democracy” (20).
• Representational Ambiguity:
  • “When respondents are to present evaluation of their countries in some regional or sectoral comparison, they find themselves in a conflicting posture. They can either truthfully narrate the way things work in their countries or elide genuiness in order to exhibit a good image. Given that a foreign research has carried out this survey, in certain number of cases respondents preferred the second option” (23).
• “Civil society is far from acting as schools of democracy from this perspective and illustrate a confusing picture. Although…these ambiguities are mostly due to rather recent configuration of independent interest groups in EE elites are also responsible for this slow development…Early stages of democratic consolidation have been characterized by the rapid consolidation of political parties and the emergence of a small, exclusive elite, dominating political life alongside a week civil society. Along with these two factors, however, is a rather inherent character of politics in the region: elitism “(25).

II. How Inherent is Elitism?

• “There have been three forms of capital under communism: economic (measured by material wealth), cultural (measured by educational credentials) and political (measured by party membership under communism). Szelényi thinks that post-communist society can be best described by the domination of cultural capital, the deflation of former political capital and by the ascent of new economic capital. In addition the first three, I will also try to locate ‘social capital’. …[S]ocial capital is a by-product of personal networks and the social interactions” (26-27).
• “[P]ossessing cultural capital draws the border between elites and the ordinary members in interest groups. Possession of cultural capital determines relative positions of actors within internal decision making, more so than participatory social capital” (27).
• “Good relations with politicians are also indicators of politically relevant social capital. … [T]his form of social capital is to be supported by cultural capital since professional qualifications are always important for politicians, and these qualifications accrue from interest groups. Therefore, social capital is supported by cultural capital and they can both transform themselves into political capital, if needed” (29-30).
• “Internal decisions making seems to rest on three major and three minor pillars in interest groups. Major pillars are conference, president and secondary decision making organs. … Experts, local branches, and ordinary members are the minor pillars of internal decision making” (31).
• “Interest groups have repeatedly inserted ‘skilled leadership’ as an important factor for the success of an interest group” (32).

Consequences of Elitism for Civil Society:

1. There are links between interest group elite and political elite in one way or another. Expertise [cultural capital] and politically relevant social capital mutually support each other and political capital is determined by their simultaneous existence.
2. Quality is more emphasized than quantity…. Interest groups look for skilled leadership and expertise rather than more members.
3. Those who are located at the central structures have more effects on decision making compared to their peers at the localities.

• “As such, these factors close routes of participation and hinder possibilities of interest groups acting as schools of democracy” (34).
• “ Individualism in forms of elitist behaviour and vertical bonds of dependency seem to be more develop than participatory common interested oriented, horizontally organized interest groups” (38).

C. Comments

This paper is mostly a collection of interview of people in Hungary, Poland, and Romania. Korkut tries to evaluate existing structures in civil society to see if it is an apt developing ground for democracy; but I feel that it does little more than survey. It is interesting to note that many of the people interviewed both realize the problems Korkut sees, but do not necessarily see them as problems—but rather the status quo.

(Summarized by Varty Defterderian, November 2006)