Arab, not Muslim, Exceptionalism

A.     Hypotheses

Historical, Cultural and Societal Factors

-         Nationalism, Ethnicity and Religion

The success of electoral competition in some non-Arab countries is not necessarily rooted in religion. However, the end of the Arab-Israeli conflict could shift the geopolitical climate and bring about democratization in some Arab states, signaling that ethnic and religious conflicts do, in fact, stifle democracy.

External Players and Influences

-         General

The Arab League has generally strengthened the non-democratic tendencies of its member countries and made it difficult for them to establish electoral competition and, ultimately, democracy.

The international community, with the help of the EU and OSCE, may partially counteract the influence of the Arab League by supporting those countries that have decided to democratize.

-         The U.S. Government

By subsidizing governments in Arab countries in order to maintain influence in the Arab-Israeli conflict, the U.S. plays a role in supporting authoritarian regimes in the Arab world.

Economic conditions

Unlike previous theories stipulate, a higher GDP per capita does not necessarily lead to democratization. In fact, some non-Arab Muslim countries with a low GDPpc are electorally competitive, whereas all Arab countries, even those with a significantly higher GDPpc, are not.

B.     Summary

Stepan and Robertson set out to analyze the significance of the democracy gap between Arab and non-Arab Muslim majority countries. They propose the existence of “Arab exceptionalism” instead of “Muslim exceptionalism,” since Arab countries form a politically distinct subset of the Muslim world and are drastically less likely to have electoral competition and, therefore, less likely to become democratic.

Political freedoms:

Using the Polity Project and Freedom House political and electoral rights scores from 1972 until 2000, S+R found that a third of non-Arab countries enjoyed significant political rights for at least three consecutive years, and a quarter for at least five years. Only one Arab country had political rights for three consecutive years and none for at least five. They conclude that in the 30 years examined, a non-Arab Muslim-majority country was almost 20 times more likely to be electorally competitive than an Arab Muslim-majority country. S+R conclude that these findings prove that the democracy gap cannot be attributed to Islam, since there seems to be a drastic difference in electoral competition between Arab and non-Arab Muslim-majority countries.

Level of Economic Development:

S+R also point out that democracy does not always depend on the wealth of the country, as previously thought. According to their research, a number of non-Arab countries were “electoral overachievers.” As predicted by their GDPpc levels, these countries should have had less political freedoms than they actually did. However, several countries, even while having the lowest GDPpc, had electoral competition for five consecutive years, showing that democratization is possible even in the poorest Muslim countries. There were at least seven non-Arab countries that are electorally competitive despite a low GDPpc and most (18 out of 29) were electorally non-competitive as predicted because of their low GDPpc. On the other hand, 7 out of 16 Arab countries were electoral underachievers, having no electoral competition despite a high GDPpc. Not one Arab country overachieved and no country was as electorally competitive as predicted, despite a high GDPpc. S+R argue that electoral competition relative to GDPpc shows that we must reevaluate the “developmental thesis,” that says wealthy countries are more likely to democratize.

Ethnicity:

Furthermore, ethnolinguistic homogeneity is not crucial for democracy. “The non-Arab countries that are electorally competitive began as politically independent countries with the highest levels of ethnolinguistic fragmentation…and the noncompetitive Arab countries began with the lowest levels of ethnolinguistic fragmentation,” showing that democratic practices are possible even in ethnically fragmented societies (40).

After ruling out religion, ethnicity and economic conditions as sources of the “Arab exceptionalism,” S+R point to the Arab “political identity” as a potential cause. Because of their involvement and proximity, the Arab-Israeli conflict is a key aspect of the Arab countries’ distinct political identity. This political identity is upheld by external players, such as when “the United States contributes to the support of authoritarianism by subsidizing some Arab regimes such as that of Egypt…because it helps to buy peace with Israel or maintain U.S. geopolitical influence in the Arab-Israeli conflict,” (42). S+R predict that only a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict can bring about change toward democracy in the Arab Muslim-majority countries.

Response to critics:

In their response to the criticisms of their original argument, S+R state that the influence of the Arab League is one reason that Arab countries are distinct from the rest of the Muslim countries and remain uncompetitive electorally. Because the organization aims to build an integrated political community, it acts as a uniting force for non-democratic governments. The Arab League members’ agreement to respect and uphold each other’s government systems makes it unlikely that any member would dare to oppose another’s autocracy, or stray from it themselves, due to the pressure and influence of the whole organization. Thus, a division between Arab and non-Arab Muslim countries is created and maintained.

External influence is also exerted on non-Arab Muslim countries by the international community, which supports those countries who wish to democratize. The EU and OSCE monitored elections in non-Arab Muslim countries, ensuring that they were genuinely competitive. While 20 of the 25 non-Arab countries requested international assistance with elections, only 5 of the 22 Arab countries did, showing not only that Arab countries are less willing to democratize but also that there is a correlation between international influence and free and fair elections. 

The authors maintain that the trend of “Arab exceptionalism” can be offset only if there is a shift in the geopolitical climate, such as an Arab-Israeli peace. This development could cause “Arab exceptionalism” to diminish and perhaps allow the countries to move toward democracy.

C.     Comment

In light of the Arab Spring uprisings, S+R’s research seems dated since some Arab countries are now democratizing. Their prediction also proved false, because an Arab-Israeli peace was not needed to initiate change in the region. Furthermore, the authors seem to imply that the Arab League is influential enough to maintain authoritarian regimes in the Arab countries, and wishes to do so. During the Arab Spring, however, the Arab League did not seek to suppress the uprisings that would ultimately lead to regime overthrow. In fact, it encouraged the uprisings by supporting the U.N.’s intervention against Qadhafi, which ultimately led to his removal. Although this recent experience contradicts the authors’ list of primary potential causes for “Arab exeptionalism,” we must continue to monitor developments in the Arab world in order to be able to assess whether “Arab exceptionalism” still exists and, if so, why.

Summarized by Tetyana Ivanishena on November 10, 2011