Corruption, Anticorruption Sentiments, and the Rule of Law

A. Relevant Hypotheses to the PDT

Rule of Law

• Krastev agrees with the PDT thesis that while institutional reform is necessary for creating a rule of law society, they are not sufficient.
• Krastev argues that rule of law culture and values are necessary for the creation of democratic society.
• Anticorruption campaigns and corruption-centered politics, however, can undermine the development of a rule of law culture
• Rule of law must be understood as a society in which the “rules of the game” are respected and citizens’ rights are consistently protected, not just a set of institutions or state capacities

The Media

• While the PDT argues that the media increases transparency and acts as a political watchdog, Krastev argues that when it comes to corruption the media damages the development of a democratic political culture
• The media overemphasizes corruption scandals in the news because they are the stories that will sell best
• Excessive media coverage leads to increased pressure for spectacular corruption convictions
  • The judicial system is often unable to fulfill the public’s desire for convictions while adhering to the principles of rule of law because corruption is a very difficult crime to prove in court
• The media’s emphasis on corruption and pressure for convictions contributes to the delegitimization of the political system, causes the public to consider politicians corrupt by definition, and causes the people to distrust the courts

Political Culture

• The PDT thesis argues that two important aspects of a healthy political culture are that the people consider the government legitimate and that they feel elections offer a real choice
• Krastev agrees that those qualities contribute to a democratic culture, however, he argues that anticorruption campaigns can actually undermine those aspects of political culture
• Anti corruption campaigns cause the public to regard all politicians as corrupt by definition and delegitimizes the government and the judicial system
• Corruption centered politics is an “end to politics” as it creates a dichotomy of the “clean opposition” versus a “corrupt government” that transforms post-communist democracy into protest-vote democracies. In this way, corruption rhetoric can alter the choices the people feel they have in an election.

Development of a Middle Class

• Krastev agrees with the PDT thesis that great social and economic inequality undermines the development of democracy
• In fact, much of the discontent the public feels about corruption, Krastev argues, stems from the increased economic inequality that resulted from the fall of communism
• Bribery, the new form of post-communist corruption (as opposed to “blat” under communism), exacerbates social and economic inequality. For this reason, the public perceives this corruption as much worse than corruption under communism

B. Article Summary

Introduction

• “The major argument of this article is that the current policy thinking misunderstands the effects of anticorruption campaigns and this blurs the prospects for the establishment of rule of law culture in Eastern Europe. (45)”
• The reason for this misunderstanding is a misreading of the public’s anticorruption sentiments
• In current policy thinking, the concept of rule of law is centered on institutions and state capacities that protect citizens from the imperfections of politics and democracy
• A rule of law culture, however, is a society in which the “rules of the game” are respected and citizens’ rights are protected

The Non-Banality of Post-Communist Corruption

• Majorities in many post-communist countries consider the post-communist political system to be more corrupt than the communist regime
• This perception cannot be accounted for solely with by the failure of market reforms
• There are two schools of explanation: the institutional and perceptionalist

The Debate

• The institutionalist argument focuses on corruption incentives and opportunities in the broad discretionary powers , heavy bureaucracies, and high level of state intervention of post-communist governments
• The perceptionalist argument distrusts the consensus that corruption is on the rise and argues that this perception is the product of a given media reality and not connected to an actual rise in corruption
• Krastev disagrees with parts of both arguments and his interpretation is that while the link between corruption perceptions and actual levels of corruption is “highly problematic,” the public’s “judgment on the rise or decline of corruption is mediated by reflections on its [corruption’s] social functions. (52)”

When Less State Does Not Mean Less Corruption

• Corruption incentives and opportunities in the institutional structure of a government only increase with actual level of corruption when they are in partnership with public tolerance of corruption and the absence of a professional bureaucracy and rule of law.
• “Values do matter,” a fact which becomes problematic for the institutionalist argument
• Not only big government, but also weak states that lack the capacity to enforce laws increase corruption
• Meanwhile, the perceptionalist argument holds perceptions of corruption are increased by the media’s sensationalism in dealing with corruption stories and political parties’ use of anticorruption rhetoric and accusations to gain power
• Neither perspective is sufficient: the institutionalists underestimate the power of political culture and the perceptionalists overestimate people’s lack of awareness of corruption in late communism as they compare it to the corruption of today

The Moral Economy of Corruption – “Now” and “Then”

• The real question is why public opinion judges post-communism as more corrupt than communism
• Krastev argues that post-communism is not actually more corrupt than communism; rather, this perception is a values statement that includes in itself a reflection on the social function of corruption
  • The public does not “simply register corruption, they judge the result of its work. (59)”
  • “One key factor in explaining the new corruption sensitivity is that one specific type of corruption has been replaced with a radically different form. (59)”

“Do Me a Favor Society” versus “Give Me a Bribe Society”

• After the fall of communism, “blat” corruption was replaced by bribery corruption
  • Blat was not considered corruption or a crime
  • Blat was a wide-spread phenomenon of the use of informal personal networks and the exchange of favors to obtain goods and services and find a way around formal procedures
• Blat exchange is mediated and euphemized by the rhetoric of friendship; by contrast, the relationship between the corruptor and corruptee is centered on the bribe
  • This rhetoric of friendship allows participants in blat transactions to misrecognize their activities as “help,” not as corruption or wrongdoing
• Moreover, blat under communism allowed the ordinary citizen to obtain goods and services using his networks rather than money, thus increasing a feeling of social equality
• In post-communism, money was inserted into the blat and social relations system, causing ordinary citizens to lose out and leading to a rise in social inequality: “Monetarization of social relation led to the inflation of the social investments that ordinary citizens have put into their blat network. Only blat networks of the powerful survived in the new conditions. (65)”
• The public’s judgment of corruption is mediated by the social function of corruption in society
• Bribery and post-communist forms of corruption are judged as more corrupt because they are more aesthetically ugly than blat, they are legally more risky, and, most importantly, they are a mechanism that produces social inequality
• “The popular anticorruption discourse is not a discourse on transparency or good government, it is a discourse on the rise of inequality. (67)”

The Rule of Law Paradox

• Krastev identifies five problems with anticorruption campaigns that have been put in place in post-communist countries:
• There is a constantly expanding definition of corruption
  • Fear of corruption accusations causes politicians to see transparency as the only goal in public policy, rather than effectiveness, choosing the most transparent option over more effective ones
  • “A corruption-centered politics is an end to politics. (69)” Anticorruption campaigns moralize politics to the extent that the only choice is between a corrupt government and a clean opposition, causing the transformation of post-Eastern European democracy into protest vote democracies
  • Anticorruption campaigns delegitimize politicians and public administration so that the public perceives politicians and corrupt by definition and young, talented people avoid work in politics or government
  • Finally, anticorruption campaigns create pressure for spectacular verdicts and convictions. However, corruption is one of the most difficult crimes to prove in court. Courts that feel a loyalty to principles of the rule of law find it difficult to impose corruption sentences. The result of a lack of convictions is a growing mistrust in the legal system and accusations that the entire judicial system is corrupt
• “The crusade against corruption can be as harmful to the emergence of rule of law culture in Eastern Europe as is the corruption itself. (71)”
• Anticorruption sentiments in Eastern European public opinion are driven not by the actual levels of corruption, but by the general disappointment with post-communist changes and the rising social inequality
• Post-communist societies need “policies that reduce corruption but not a rhetoric that leads to corruption-centered politics. (71)”