The Seven Ingredients: When Democracy Promotion Works

A. Main Hypotheses of Relevance to PDT

Applicability

Mendelson’s paper suggests that lessons learned in countries with particular characteristics should be applied with caution to countries that aren’t working within that same context.

Mass Movements

Political parties, NGOs and the media must work together to form a strong united front against incumbent regimes.

In anticipation of an electoral revolution, activists should use the newest technologies including, ‘parallel vote tabulation’ (PVT), focus groups and polling data to detect election fraud.

Role of the Media

The media should be seen and used as a public space in which activists can spread their message. Without this medium it will be hard for activists to communicate the where and how of the movement they want to catalyze.

External Factors

More funding should be devoted to new electoral fraud detecting technologies, the media and the training necessary to carry both of these endeavors out.

Outsiders can advise local activists on how to create the best conditions for political change by encouraging them to create strong united coalitions and to search for back channels to security services.

Mendelson suggests the creation of an international training center that can help match up local activists with like-minded international democracy trainers.
B. Article Summary

From the sidelines of the Serbian and Georgian democratic victories, activists watched secretly and silently puzzled. What exactly did the Serbian and Georgian democracy activists get right? Sarah Mendelson offers a list of the seven ingredients needed to make democracy promotion work.

Conditions outsiders can affect:

   1. Getting Supply and Demand Right The Georgian success reaffirmed the importance of matching local activists with like-minded international democracy trainers. Often, international democracy trainers will be fluent in promotion tactics that are not specifically applicable to the political environment local activists are working under. In order to prevent these mismatches, Mendelson suggests the establishment of an international training center that can match activists from around the world with the resources they need.
   2. Sufficient International Assistance The U.S. has made the mistake of rhetorically supporting democracy promotion in regions such as the Middle East, while underfunding Central Asia and Russia just as activist capacity has increased and threats from authorities have multiplied. A strategic analysis of what goals really are and how much money is needed to achieve them would likely reveal that the impact of democratic promotion is especially great in less populated countries such as Serbia and Georgia. Armed with a well-articulated plan of attack, targeting funds to realistic goals will save the U.S. a lot of money, while actually producing tangible improvements to democracy.
   3. Technology “The regime changes were not only about people taking [control] of the streets but also about science” (87). Activists relied on specific technologies such as ‘parallel vote tabulation’ (PVT), focus groups and polling data to detect election fraud. Menedelson recommends that before the next voting cycle in Russia, donors will take seriously the need to fund and train for this complex operation.

Conditions outsiders cannot affect:

   1. Coalitions. “An organized opposition is always better than a disorganized one” (87). In Georgia and Serbia, NGOs, political parties, and the media all worked together. While outsiders cannot create coalitions they can remind local activists of what happens when strong coalitions are absent.
   2. Media. It is imperative that activists take advantage of this outlet to get their message across. Without a public space, they cannot mobilize; without a platform from which to speak, they cannot drive people to the polls when necessary. Mendelson advises donors and policy makers to focus more on this arena, according it with the appropriate priority in foreign assistance it deserves.
   3. Security Services. “Security Services in both Serbia and Georgia were critical in enabling citizens to assemble without violence” (87). Because security services are strategic actors that make calculations about whom the winners and losers are likely to be, they can be influenced by the mistakes made by the incumbent regime. “Outsiders should encourage local stakeholders to create back channels to security services” (87).
   4. The Hard Part. Often, the harsh reality is that even when all of these conditions do exist, the critical work only just begins the day after elections. “It is in the months and years that follow a peaceful revolution that the true tests come” (87).

C. Comment

This is a well structured but very short article. It is unfortunate that the author does not go into further detail about each of the ingredients.
(Summarized by Yomaira Tamayo, 07/10/06)

 

* Sarah Mendelson is a Senior Fellow in the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C.