Is the Age of Post-Soviet Electoral Revolutions Over?

A. Main Hypotheses of Relevance to PDT

Applicability

Electoral revolutions may potentially work in countries with ‘soft’ authoritarianism like Moldova or Armenia. For the rest of the region, the paradigm of electoral revolutions is largely a thing of the past.

Political Institutions

Executive power

Whether it is by electoral or traditional means, incumbents who hold a weak grip over the state, their party, economic resources, and/or coercive means are far more easily overthrown than those in systems in which authority is firmly concentrated in the hands of a single leader.

Parties

During the tumultuous time of regime change, the opposition must work together in order to mobilize enough people to create the kind of political ‘noise’ needed to turnover a government.

Mass Mobilization

The age of post-Soviet electoral revolutions is over. Democratic promoters will have to resort to either traditional style revolutions, or think up new and innovative ways to approach regime change.

External Factors

Silitsky thinks that the greatest mistake democracy promoters can make is to view repressive leaders and frightened populations as possessing no desire for democratic change. Though future regime transformation may be some time away for some countries in the region, democracy promoters must prepare for the ideal moment by cultivating and nurturing responsible democratic actors.

B. Article Summary

Silitsky maintains that any talk about “democratic contagion” can now rest at a silent murmur. This very assertive article delineates the reasons for which the author claims the post-Soviet wave of revolutions is certainly over.

A democratic future for the remaining autocratic states in the region may now be even more implausible than before because the conditions that existed in successful countries no longer exist in the rest of the region. By and large, mass movements succeeded where:

1. The demand for political change was overwhelming;
2.  The incumbent leaders had antagonized their societies through repression, mismanagement and corruption;
3. The opposition worked together;
4. Civil society had matured enough to mobilize both voters and peaceful protesters;
5. Incumbents did not possess total control over the institutions of the state. This allowed for a reasonably liberal political life to flourish both in parliament and between elections. In these cases, parliament and the courts were sufficiently independent to act according to law, not out of fear or loyalty;
6. Incumbents did not possess total control over financial means. In all the successful revolutionary episodes, oligarchic capitalism had emerged. This made it much easier to sustain the opposition at points when incumbents attempted to cut the opposition off from foreign assistance;
7. Incumbents were relatively complacent. When the colored revolutions began authoritarian leaders across the region discounted the threat to their own regimes. They had not yet digested the impact of Serbia on activists everywhere.

In contrast to the democratically friendly environment described above, the competitive authoritarian systems of the post-Soviet region have a firm grip on their parties, the state and coercive mechanisms. In these countries, political and civil society is weak and representative institutions are largely for show. Control over economic resources is much more concentrated, partly due to the abundance of raw materials in the area. To add to all of these disadvantages, incumbent’s complacency has been replaced with fear and anxiety. Today, the autocrats of the region are now very aware of the possibility that recent evolutionary fervor could create a domino effect heading straight for their front doors.

Although pessimistic about the prospects of any future electoral revolutions, Silitsky does not imply that democratization has come to a stand still. He suggests that while a strictly electoral scenario is unlikely to happen anywhere, except for one or two countries (Moldova, maybe Armenia) still characterized by ‘soft’ authoritarianism, opposition challengers may find success in carrying out more traditional revolutions. The Tulip Revolution is a great example of what can happen when democratic contagion and official preemption collide head on. While the government had certainly learned from the Ukrainian and Georgian experiences, the opposition, once denied any chance of succeeding through elections, went straight to the streets. Once it was clear who had won the contest of force, the opposition needed no electoral legitimacy.

There are several reasons why investment into this kind of regime turnover may not be the most ideal strategy for our purposes. First, it can lead to the absence of political legitimacy and a recognized leader. This can make a transition to democracy rather chaotic to organize. Second, this is not the kind of mass movement outsiders can overtly encourage or fund. It was fine to promote electoral revolutions because they were grounded in legitimate electoral exercises.

The most important lesson to be drawn from the Kyrgyzstani uprising is that there is no stopping citizens committed to changing their government. Incumbents may “successfully rebuff challenges for years, but in reality they are like underground miners—one mistake can mean their end” (6).

C. Comments

The claim that the electoral revolutions are a thing of the past seems a bit overstated. I am not convinced that electoral revolutions have become a useless means of regime change. I am convinced that activists must be innovative in their methods. Future revolutionary movements need to keep in mind that the political climate has seriously changed from the time of Milosevic’s turnover; dictators have become just as innovative as activists in trying to repress the opposition.

(Summarized by Yomaira Tamayo, 07/10/06)

* Between 1999 and 2003, Dr. Vitali Silitsky was an associate professor of economics at the European Humanities University in Minsk, Belarus, a position he was forced to leave for criticizing the government.