Democratic Promotion

A. Main Hypotheses of Relevance to PDT

Applicability

The agendas of democracy promotion should be custom tailored to different regions and specific countries. Unless they can exist in harmony with local democratic actors, democracy assistance programs run the risk of being branded as ‘foreign imposition.’

Political Institutions

Executive Powers

The combination of weak or failing states and democratic or semi-authoritarian rule have turned out to be a dangerous breeding ground for terrorist groups. This will become increasingly important as the focus of our project moves further east, where more countries fit this description.

 

Elections

While support for free and fair elections is important, the international community needs to pay closer attention to the aftermath. The quality of democratic processes—including transparent and accountable government—should be given greater priority.

Economic and Sociological Factors

Economic liberalization

The programs and policies of international financial and economic institutions should aim at strengthening the economic foundations of democracy. The objective must be to reduce the dependency of poor states on foreign economic aid. The WTO, for instance, should move more aggressively against agricultural subsidies in rich countries.

External Factors

Unless democratization is demonstrably fraught with risks of strengthening terrorist networks, the international community should take measures to assist the advancement of democracy because it can help assuage terrorist objections (i.e. inequality, the disempowerment of certain groups and the impossibility to express legitimate grievances).

Democracy assistance programs should focus on long-term support rather than quick results. Success depends on local resources (individuals, civil society, etc.) and building those resources takes time.

International institutions that promote democracy need greater accountability. Independent bodies should monitor and evaluate their activities.

B. Article Summary

March 8-11th 2005, The Club of Madrid held the International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security in response to the Madrid bombings. In the months leading up to the summit, more than two hundred of the world’s leading scholars and expert practitioners explored the issues of democracy and terrorism through a system of web-logs. Each working group issued a final paper of recommendations on which the contributions of The Madrid Summit Working Paper Series are based. This paper, a chapter from the third volume of the series, is devoted to determining the linkages between democracy and terrorism by identifying the major areas of contention and consensus, and suggesting a number of practical policy recommendations.

Areas of Discussion

Liberal democracy as a target of terrorism?

One interpretation of this question among the working group members was that radical Islamic terror is an expression of resentment against the values of liberal democracy. If this is true, then Nodia concludes “that they must be viewed as the latest version of anti-liberal reaction represented by Nazism, Communism,” etc. (21). However, this vision of radical Islamist terrorism was strongly challenged within the working group. Some members of the group maintained that it was not liberal democracy per se, but specific policies of Western democracies, to which the terrorists objected. Despite this disagreement, there was universal concern that democracies could be tempted to respond to terrorist attacks by curtailing civil liberties and weakening their own standards of transparency and accountability. There was a consensus that defending oneself against terrorism entails not just the use of instruments of conventional security, but also the preservation of democratic institutions. Not doing so would mean that the terrorists’ goals (real or hypothetical) would be fulfilled.

Democracy as the antidote to terrorism?

Empirical evidence suggests that democracy cannot always be a reliable antidote against the proliferation of terrorists. Even consolidated democracies have had to deal with the problem of terror. Moreover, the task of democratizing may in fact turn out to be destabilizing for hybrid countries that are composed of weak or failing states, as they can turn out to be a dangerous breeding ground for terrorists to take political gains. Despite all of these claims, the working group did agree that at least where democratization is not demonstrably fraught with risks of strengthening terrorist networks, the international democratic community should step up its efforts to assist the advancement of democracy.

Democracy promotion and terrorist threats

It is necessary to recognize that there are many instances in which democrcacy promotion can be counter-productive. First, democracy promotion has become synonymous with Western imperialism, meaning that open support for local democrats by Western powers can actually become a ‘kiss of death.’ Second, democracy implemented through military imposition as exemplified by the war in Iraq is not practical because democracy is about the freedom of choice and should emerge internally.

Solidarity and cooperation between democracies

The American-led military campaign against terrorism—in particular the war in Iraq—has created a rift between the United States and its traditional democratic allies, as well as among other supporters of democracy around the world. There was a consensus that this rift needs to be overcome in order to form a strong front of democratic countries committed to fighting terrorism.

Policy Recommendations

· The agendas of democracy promotion should be custom tailored to different regions and specific countries.

· Democracy assistance programs should focus on long-term support rather than quick results.

· Democracy assistance programs need to include components for enhancing the effectiveness of state institutions in weak states.

· Democracy promotion should provide support for opposition as an institution, as well as aim at enhancing the rights and representation of minorities. The exclusion of groups from political and public life only pushes them towards extreme methods.

· We must strengthen local actors who are in the position to rebut demagogues, who use the local values and history to discredit universal liberal and democratic principles.

· The international community needs to focus more attention on the aftermath of elections.

· The programs and policies of international financial and economic institutions should aim at strengthening the economic foundations of democracy.

· The emphasis on the Middle East in the context of fighting terrorism and promoting democracy must not overshadow the importance of other regions, such as Africa, Latin America and others.

· International institutions that promote democracy need greater accountability. Independent bodies should monitor and evaluate their activities.

· Democratic countries must bear in mind that their presence can, at times, create an even more hostile environment for democracy. They should take a step back when immediate involvement could turn out to be counterproductive.

· Regarding the issue of Islam and democracy, great caution and sensitivity is of utmost importance. A strong distinction should be made between Islam as a religion and Islam as a civilization. Moderate forms of Islam must be engaged rather than marginalized.

C. Comments

While some of this document is not directly relevant to the project, I think that it can serve as a rough model of what our set of policy recommendations should look like. I left the format exactly the same as it was in the publication and only summarized the contents. Moreover, this working group did an excellent job of compiling a coherent set of issues and recommendations that included all sides of the debate. Of relevance to our hypotheses, the issue of weak semi-authoritarian states becoming destabilized by the process of democratization is one that may become increasingly important to the project as our attention moves eastward.

(Summarized by Yomaira Tamayo, 07/10/06)

* Ghia Nodia is the coordinator for The Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development in Georgia.