Regime Cycles: Democracy, Autocracy, and Revolution in Post-Soviet Russia

A.    Main Hypotheses

Political Dynamics

- Mass mobilization

 Popular protests that support an opposition candidate before an election can sway elites to defect and join the opposition.

 - The role of elites and of individual leaders

Individual leaders who exhibit the “lame duck syndrome” may cause elites to become disunited. Some elites will defect in order to secure their future with the winning candidate. A division between the elites results in significant oscillations within the regime as well as an increase in contestation and participation, which undermine authoritarianism.

External Players and Influences

Western support of an opposition candidate can increase the chances of mass mobilization and elite defection.

B.     Article Summary

Hale argues that theorists of regime change should pay closer attention to the cycles that drive change, since they are not random instability but in fact are reasonably predictable. Hales warns against looking at regimes as ideal types, either democracy or authoritarianism, but to look at countries in terms of its levels of contestation and participation.

One variable that affects a country’s regime type is the presence of patronal presidentialism, or a president that wields power over the state as well as widespread patron-client relationships. Such a president can use his vast resources to co-opt troublemakers within the regime in order to prevent elite opposition. The president can divide and rule the elites, eliminating the possibility of a united opposition. When elite cohesion is high, however, the regime is not likely to develop high levels of contestation and participation.

Nonetheless, elite defection is likely to occur when there is an anticipated power transfer. A Patronal presidentialist ruler can eventually exhibit the “lame duck syndrome,” signaling to elites that the president may be leaving office and precipitating defection. Elites may remain uncertain whether to support opposition candidates or the incumbent, fearing punishment if the other side wins the election. Though there is much uncertainty, popular support for one particular candidate can influence elites to defect to that side. Thus, presence of at least one viable challenger increases the chances of elite defection as well as the contestation phase. Another variable that affects a country’s regime type is the relationships between elites. The more disunited the elites are, the more oscillation and instability the regime will experience. Elite cohesion, on the other hand, discourages opposition. In light of this analysis of regime cycles, Hale gives three examples of post-Soviet succession cases:

Successful succession

Russia serves as Hale’s primary example of a country where a patronal presidentialist incumbent was successful in appointing his successor. The incumbent, Yeltsin, exhibited clientalistic control and used his resources to maintain the vulnerability of elites by prosecuting them (as seen in the case of Khodorkovsky). By the end of his presidency, elites became uncertain about Yelstin’s ability to survive his last bid for election, and so defected to the Communist Party. Once Yeltsin’s campaign proved successful, many elites reverted back to supporting him and he won the reelection. At the end of Yeltsin’s term, elites anticipated a power transfer and began siding with different candidates. However, few sided with Putin, Yeltsin’s chosen successor and a political unknown at the time. All of the elites had relatively equal influence in the election, such as significant control of media. However, it was public opinion that tipped the scales and showed support for the incumbent’s successor, when Putin reacted to bombings in Moscow by sending troops to Chechnya (he was then Prime Minister). Visible public support for Putin resulted in the majority of elites supporting him as well, bringing him an easy victory and stifling all contestation. Though the “lame duck syndrome” first threatened the incumbent, popular support of his successor brought him the victory.

Unsuccessful succession

Ukraine is Hale’s primary example of an unsuccessful succession case where popular support for the opposition resulted in a shift in the regime. Like Yeltsin, Kuchma enjoyed significant clientalistic control and used blackmail to suppress elites. It was not until his corruption was brought to light in the media, via the Gongadze case, that Kuchma’s popularity began to plummet and cause elites to defect. Kuchma also exhibited the “lame duck syndrome” once he stated that he would not run for reelection, enabling Yuschenko to emerge as a viable rival. Yuschenko’s popularity convinced elites that he might win the election, especially because he enjoyed wide Western support and the approval of the international community. Elites who did not immediately defect tried to maintain support of both candidates. For instance, Yanukovich’s son-in-law and oligarch, Pinchuk, financially supported Yanukovich and Yuschenko, not wanting to jeopardize his future with the regime. After the Kyiv administration defected, protesters gathered in the capital, causing more elites to defect. Thus, an anticipated power transfer in the partonal presidentialism enabled mass support and elite defection, resulting in Yuschenko’s victory.

No succession

Countries like Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have not experienced the “lame duck syndrome,” because incumbents have made it clear that they did not intend to leave office. The Tajik president, for example, began his term by extending the legal term limit, causing elites to be obedient to him and eliminating any room for an opposition. Thus, elite cohesion prevented high levels of contestation and participation in the regime.

C.    Comment

Hale is correct to draw a connection between elite defection and popular support for the opposition and could have predicted the result of Ukraine’s last election even in 2005. It became clear that elite defection and a lack of popular support for the incumbent, Yuschenko, resulted in Yanukovich’s election in 2010. Similarly, public support for Putin preserved the obedience of his elites and enabled him to choose a successful successor, Medvedev. Though Hale is strict in applying this analysis solely to post-Soviet states, it will be interesting to see if any MENA countries experience the same cycles once their new and future presidents face reelection.

(Summarized by Tetyana Ivanishena on 12/15/2011)