Beyond Electoral Authoritarianism: The Spectrum of Non-Democratic Regimes

A. Hypotheses

Available measures of progress

The outcome of a non-democratic regime’s transition to democracy depends on whether it is a “personalistic” or “military” regime.

Role of elites and individual leaders

If a regime has frustrated elites, who are not part of a “personalistic” leader’s nepotism, they can turn on the leader in a crisis and bring down the regime.


 

B. Article Summary

According to Snyder, regimes that hold elections can have varying outcomes based on the degree of authoritarianism, strength, and type of leadership in the regime.

Who rules and how?

The leadership of an authoritarian regime, whether it is the military, a political party, or a personal leader, determines the method of rule and, therefore, how likely the regime is to experience a transition.

A “personalistic” leader runs a fully authoritarian regime via the patron-client network, filling the top leadership posts with family and friends (e.g., Haiti, Paraguay, Libya). This alienates other elites, such as career officers and bureaucrats, leaving them disgruntled and ready to turn on the regime. Snyder cites the Philippines as an example, where frustrated members of the regime attempted a military coup that led to Marcos’ departure. Furthermore, “personalistic” regime rulers may not control the military apparatus, and are thus left vulnerable if they lose elections.

On the contrary, in a “military” regime, the method of rule is coercion. Since rulers control the means of coercion, election results rarely affect them and they can continue to keep their power even after losing at the polls (e.g., Burma, Algeria).

Why do rulers rule?

The reason for a ruler’s rule can explain the outcome of a regime transition, with or without elections. “Personalistic” rulers are usually motivated by greed and are more likely to give up power than theocratic, totalitarian, or “ethnocratic” rulers who are motivated by ideology (e.g., Iran, Cuba and Syria, respectively). However, new international norms of holding dictators responsible even after they give up rule may influence them to refuse to leave except by force. 

How much do rulers rule?

Election results also affect the degree of rule. In competitive authoritarian regimes, elections either support the regime or undermine it, ultimately influencing the stability of the incumbents and the state as a whole. As exemplified by the Soviet Union, elections that bring about state collapse are considered “state-subverting.”

Elections in the context of a collapsed state do not confer power to the new government due to the absence of state apparatus and infrastructure. Thus, the “parties” that compete in these elections tend to be armed groups (e.g., Liberia, Angola).

Snyder concludes by stating that Linz’s mobilization and ideology dimensions of totalitarianism are not out of date yet. Islamic fundamentalism, indigenous nationalism and populism continue to mobilize people in the Middle East, Bolivia and Venezuela, respectively.

C. Comment

Because Snyder suggests a variety of distinct authoritarian regimes, one implication is that simple Freedom House ratings overlook crucial differences, especially between “personalistic” and “military” regimes. The role of elections in regard to the type of ruler in each regime can differ significantly. Thus, democracy promotion policies that promote elections without allowing for how fully authoritarian regimes can exploit them to stay in power might backfire. Ironically, they could well end up helping a determined “military” regime consolidate itself, instead of facilitating a transition to democracy.

(Summarized by Tetyana Ivanishena on October 6, 2011)