Georgia’s Rose Revolution: From Regime Weakness to Regime Collapse

A. Main Hypotheses

The media

Relatively free media in Georgia exposed incumbent vulnerability by supporting the opposition, broadcasting and encouraging public involvement in protest, as well as cosponsoring and releasing pre-election opinion polls. 

Mass mobilization

Even with relatively small numbers of protesters, mass protests further undermined the already weakly consolidated incumbents.

Civil Society

Georgian NGOs expedited the regime transition by exposing election fraud via opinion polls and parallel vote tabulation.

External Influence

       - US Government and NGOs

Through USAID assistance, the US government actively supported NGOs that empowered the opposition, thus promoting at least a significantly more democratic election than it would have been.

B. Summary

Vulnerability of the Regime

Georgia’s Rose Revolution began with a vulnerable government that pushed itself to the brink of collapse. 

First, the vulnerability of the regime was a direct result of public disenchantment with Shevardnadze and the perception of the ruling party (Citizens’ Union of Georgia) as a corrupt and criminal organization.

Prior defeat in local election and the ranking of top government officials at the bottom of opinion polls further demonstrated regime weakness.

Relatively free broadcast media, especially channel Rustavi-2, openly criticized the government and sided with the opposition, encouraged protests, and announced opinion polls detrimental to the government.

Though Shevardnadze claimed he was prepared to use force against protesters, he never did, allowing competition and protests to flourish. This exposed the reality of his vulnerability.

From Vulnerability to Collapse

According to Welt, it was the interaction between opposition and the state that magnified the regime vulnerability and ultimately led to its collapse. Opposition coalition-building, specifically between the National Movement and Democrats parties, was critical for the success of protests.

Georgian observers characterize the media as the most active part of the opposition, playing a crucial role in the Rose Revolution. Rustavi-2 frequently sided with the opposition, encouraged protests, and released timely opinion poll results. Constant coverage of protests and government criticism “dramatically confirmed the vulnerability of the regime, and ensured that dissent was transmitted to as wide and politically diverse an audience as possible,” (174).

Security forces failed to use force during protests and the rushing of parliament, and never implemented Shevardnadze’s order for a state of emergency.

The Role of External Factors

External pressure to democratize came from both the US government and NGOs. USAID and the British Council provided support for to NGOs like the Open Society Georgia Foundation and the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy, which then organized opinion polls and parallel vote tabulation to track and compare votes.

US influence in Georgia was substantial, though it yielded limited results. “USAID budgeted more democracy-related assistance to Georgia in 2002 and 2003 than to any post-Soviet state except the considerably larger Russia and Ukraine,” (183). US aid increased pressure on the Shevardnadze government to hold democratic elections, and increased the likelihood of citizen participation. Ultimately, US refusal to support the new Georgian government reinforced regime vulnerability.

C.     Comments

Welt seems to agree with Levistky and Way that Georgia was a competitive authoritarian regime. However, he argues that the mass protests were more spontaneous, less organized by Shevardnadze regime defectors, and a more important cause of the regime’s collapse than L+W suggest. Since mass protest can be so important, democracy promotion programs should continue to support the opposition actors and NGOs that help make it happen. Unfortunately, Welt mentions nothing about the possibility of Russia’s countervailing, anti-democratic “black knight” role in Georgia, including its 2008 invasion.

 (Summarized by Tetyana Ivanishena 08/10/2011)